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MOVING BEYOND MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: A SIMPLIFIED
METHOD FOR ASSESSING EVIDENCE IN DISCRIMINATION
CASES*
Denny Chint & Jodi Golinsky*t
I NTRODUCTION
In 1973, the Supreme Court established the McDonnell
Douglas test, a three-stage, burden-shifting framework for analyzing
employment discrimination cases.' The test proved difficult to ap-
ply and, twenty-five years later, courts are still struggling with it.
Many lower courts have sought to simplify the analysis,2 which has
been heavily criticized by judges, practitioners, and academics
alike.3 In the last year alone, the Second Circuit has compared the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to a "ping-pong-like
match"4 and district judges within the Circuit have described it as a
"yo-yo rule,"' "danc[ing] mechanistically through the
'minuets,"' 6 and a "thicket."7
© 1998 Denny Chin and Jodi Golinsky. All Rights Reserved.
United States District Judge, Southern District of New York.
t Brooklyn Law School, Class of 1998. The authors thank Robert L. Tsai for his
invaluable contributions to this article.
' We refer, of course, to the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green. 411 U.S. 792 (1972) [hereinafter McDonnell Douglas]. The McDonnell Doug-
las framework applies in disparate treatment employment discrimination cases where a
plaintiff does not have direct evidence of discrimination. Cf. Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
2 See infra notes 53 & 68.
1 Numerous law review articles as well as court decisions have addressed the weak-
nesses in the approach. See generally R. Alexander Acosta & Eric J. Von Vorys, Bursting
Bubbles and Burdens of Proofk The Deepening Disagreement on the Summary Judgment
Standard in Disparate Treatment Employment Discrimination Cases, 2 TEX. REv. L. &
POL'Y 207 (1998) [hereinafter Bursting Bubbles]; Scott Black, McDonnell Douglas' Prima
Facie Case and the Non-Minority Plaintiff: Is Modification Required?, 1994 ANNUAL SUR-
VEY OF AM. LAW 309 (1995); Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shift-
ing Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 703 (1995) [here-
inafter Stumbling Three-Step]; Shifting Burdens of Proof in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1579 (1996) [hereinafter Shifting Burdens].
Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1998).
Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 992 F. Supp. 372, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
' jalal v. Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 4 F. Supp. 2d 224, 234 (S.D.N.Y.
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Recent Second Circuit cases have emphasized that the "ulti-
mate issue" in an employment discrimination case is whether the
plaintiff has proven that it is more likely than not that the adverse
employment decision was motivated at least in part by an "imper-
missible reason."' The McDonnell Douglas test, however, actually
invites juries and courts to lose sight of the ultimate issue by focus-
ing their attention away from the existence or non-existence of
evidence of discrimination.9 As the Second Circuit has cautioned,
"ihe thick accretion of cases interpreting this burden-shifting frame-
work should not obscure the simple principle that lies at the core of
anti-discrimination cases. In these, as in most other cases, the
plaintiff has the ultimate burden of persuasion.""
Employment discrimination is a critical area of the law. From a
purely statistical point of view, employment discrimination cases
comprise a substantial part of our docket.1 Beyond the numbers,
however, employment discrimination law touches all aspects of our
society, from the most powerful and influential to the everyday
worker. 2 Recent high-profile cases remind us that we have not yet
achieved the goal of the civil rights statutes to eradicate discrimi-
1998).
' Fesce v. Guardsman Elevator Co., No. 96 Civ. 6793, 1998 WL 142350, at *7 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 1998).
8 Fields v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabili-
ties, 115 F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1997); accord Greenway, 143 F.3d at 47. A plaintiff
can meet that burden by using a "mixed-motives analysis'--focusing proof directly at the
question of discrimination and proving that an impermissible reason was the motivating
factor in the employment decision at issue, see Stratton v. Department for the Aging for
the City of N.Y., 132 F.3d 869, 878 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1997), or by proving 'pretexr
under the McDonnell Douglas test by showing that a purportedly legitimate reason for
an employment decision was really a cover-up for discrimination.
9 See Greenway, 143 F.3d at 53; Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st
Cir. 1979) ("to read [the McDonnell Douglas test's] technical aspects to a jury . ..will
add little to the juror's understanding of the case and, even worse, may lead jurors to
abandon their own judgment and to seize upon poorly understood legalisms to decide
the ultimate question of discrimination.').
10 Norton v. Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1998).
" The most recent statistics show that for the fiscal year ending September 30,
1997, almost 90/0 of new cases filed in the federal district courts nationwide were em-
ployment civil rights cases. Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Annual Report of the Director:
Judicial Business of the United States Courts, Table C-2 at 128-30 (1997). The employ-
ment civil rights category surpassed all categories except two: prisoner civil rights cases
and "Other" personal injury/products liability cases. Id.
12 See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (in-
volving a claim of sexual harassment by an oil platform crew worker); Jones v. Clinton,
990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (involving a claim against the President of the
United States for sexual harassment).
[Vol. 64:2
ASSESSING EVIDENCE IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
nation from the workplace. 3 In this complex, evolving area of the
law, 4 the principal tool for evaluating a claim of discrimination is
a twenty-five year old rule that has long outlived its usefulness. The
time has come for a change.
In this Article, we examine the criticisms of the McDonnell
Douglas test and suggest a different; simplified approach to weigh-
ing and evaluating evidence of discrimination, one that more sharp-
ly focuses on the "ultimate issue." Part I discusses McDonnell Doug-
las and its progeny. Pait II discusses the criticisms of the McDonnell
Douglas approach in the context of the Second Circuit's latest deci-
sions on the assessment of evidence and burdens of proof in dis-
crimination cases. Finally, Part III advances a simplified but more
focused approach for evaluating and weighing evidence of
discrimination.
13 See, e.g., Michele Himmelberg, Workplace Bias, Discrimination: The Texaco,
Mitsubishi and U.S. Army scandals have opened the door to new employee allegations,
lawsuits and renewed union efforts, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Jan. 13, 1997, at D06;
Thomas S. Mulligan, Texaco Bias Case Decision Has Glass Ceilings Rattling; Workplace:
Employees claiming discrimination get more attention, Los ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 8, 1996,
at D1 ("The impact of the Texaco case is rippling through courtrooms and workplaces
across the country . . . .'); Clarence Page, Texaco tapes prove that job discrimination
still goes on, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 10, 1996, at 5J; Smith Barney, female bro-
kers reach agreement, Settlement in discrimination, harassment case may surpass
Texaco's $115 million payout, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 18, 1997, at 4D; Texaco
leads parade of eye-opening discrimination cases in the workplace, SAN ANTONIO Ex-
PRESS-NEWs, Dec. 29, 1996, at 3G; see also Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 955 (1994)
('[n]early thirty years after the passage of this landmark civil rights legislation [the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, designed to eradicate discrimination against minorities], its goals
remain unfulfilled.") (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"4 Significant changes continue to be made in the law of employment discrimination
as courts grapple with the difficult task of evaluating discrimination. In its October 1997
term alone, the Supreme Court heard a number of first impression discrimination cases.
See, e.g., Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 998 (concerning whether same-sex harassment is action-
able under Title VII); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998)
(concerning liability under Title IX for harassment of a student by a teacher); Burlington
Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998) (concerning liability for discrimination
where an employee suffers no tangible economic damages); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998) (concerning vicarious liability of an employer for its
supervisor's actionable discrimination against an employee).
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I. THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS TEST AND ITS EVOLUTION
As the Supreme Court reminded us in McDonnell Douglas,
"Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination subtle or otherwise.""5
Yet, direct proof of discrimination in employment cases is rare, and
subtle discrimination, in particular, is difficult to prove. Consequent-
ly, the Supreme Court recognized in McDonnell Douglas that a
plaintiff in a discrimination case may defeat a motion for summary
judgment and ultimately prevail at trial by proving discrimination
indirectly. To determine whether a plaintiff has met the burden of
proving discrimination indirectly, the Supreme Court laid out a
three-step, burden-shifting test that purported to resolve the "critical
issue ... concern[ing] the order and allocation of proof in a private,
non-class action challenging employment discrimination." 6
As originally articulated by the Court in McDonnell Douglas,
the three-pronged, burden-shifting test was to operate as follows:
the first prong requires the plaintiff to establish a "prima facie" case
of discrimination. 7 The plaintiff satisfies this burden by showing
that: (1) the plaintiff belonged to a "racial minority"; (2) the plaintiff
applied for a job for which the plaintiff was qualified, and the em-
ployer was seeking applicants; (3) the plaintiff was rejected; and (4)
the position remained open, and the employer continued to seek
applications from persons with plaintiff's qualifications.' Acknowl-
edging the extent to which the facts in discrimination cases will
vary, the Court noted that its articulation of the prima facie proof
required of plaintiff is "not necessarily applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations." 9
Once the plaintiff makes a showing of a prima facie case, the
burden "then must shift [in the second prong of the test] to the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employee's rejection."" If the employer articulates some legiti-
15 McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1972) (emphasis added).
16 Id. at 800. The Court acknowledged there was a "notable lack of harmony" in
the way courts stated the applicable rules as to burden of proof and claimed to "now
address the problem.' Id. at 801.
17 Id. at 802.
18 Id. at 802.
IS Id. at n.13.
20 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court did not attempt to "detail every
matter which fairly could be recognized" as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Id. at
802-03. Instead, the Court accepted the employer's articulated reason, namely that the
employee in question participated in unlawful conduct. Id. at 803.
[Vol. 64:2
ASSESSING EVIDENCE IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, it will suffice to "meet
the prima facie case, but the inquiry must not end here."2 Rather,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff in the third prong of the test to
prove that the employer's stated reason "was in fact pretext."22 The
third prong requires plaintiff to prove, in effect, that the "presump-
tively valid reasons for [the employment decision at issue] were in
fact a coverup" for discrimination.23
The three-pronged test articulated in McDonnell Douglas has
evolved over the years. What follows is a brief discussion of each
prong of the test as applied today as well as a summary of the
current application of the test in the Second Circuit.
A. Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case
The elements of a prima facie case have transformed in the
years since McDonnell Douglas was decided. The Second Circuit
requires a plaintiff to show that she or he (1) is a member of a pro-
tected class; (2) who is qualified for the position; (3) who suffered
an adverse employment action; (4) under circumstances giving rise
to an inference of discrimination.2 4 In at least one recent high-pro-
file decision, however, the Second Circuit used an earlier version of
the fourth element: "the ultimate filling of the position by a person
not of the protected class."2"
The fourth element is the most important to note because it has
gone through various iterations in the years since McDonnell Doug-
las was decided. The McDonnell Douglas court framed the element
in terms of a position remaining unfilled. In subsequent years, the
fourth element was articulated in terms of a position being filled by
a person who was outside the protected class. Today, most Second
Circuit decisions26 frame the fourth element as requiring the plain-
tiff to have suffered the adverse employment action under circum-
stances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. The subtle
21 Id. at 804.
2 Id.
23 Id. at 805.
24 See, e.g., Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1997).
1 Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1335 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 851 (1998).
26 See Fesce v. Guardsman Elevator Co., No. 96 Civ. 6793, 1998 WL 142350, at *7
n.5 and accompanying text (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 1998) (discussing the inconsistency of the
fourth element of the prima facie case); Jalal v. Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 4
F. Supp. 2d 224, 232-33 & n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
27 See generally O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996)
1998]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
yet important changes as to what constitutes a prima facie case are
confusing.28 In fact, the way this fourth element has evolved, it is
essentially the same inquiry as the third prong of the McDonnell
Douglas test discussed below.
Despite any confusion over the elements, the showing that the
plaintiff must make to establish a prima facie case is "de mini-
mis";29 only "minimal" proof of discrimination is necessary." The
Supreme Court described the prima facie case a decade after
McDonnell Douglas in the following manner: "The prima facie case
method established in McDonnell Douglas was 'never intended to
be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.' ". Not only is the prima facie
case not "rigid or mechanized," but the Second Circuit remarked in
Fisher v. Vassar College32 that "[i]n our diverse workplace, virtually
any [employment] decision.., will support a slew of prima facie
cases of discrimination."33
B. Defendant's Burden to Explain its Actions
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts
under McDonnell Douglas to the defendant employer to articulate a
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Since the ultimate burden
of persuasion remains with the plaintiff, however, confusion crop-
ped up in the courts concerning what the defendant had to prove at
this stage. In Texas Community Affairs v. Burdine,34 the Court ex-
(holding that replacement of person by another person in same protected class does not
defeat age discrimination claim); Bratek v. Merck & Co., Inc., 91 Civ. 0252, 1993 WL
124747, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (hiring a woman to replace a woman alleging gender
discrimination does not necessarily disprove discrimination).
28 See Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 992 F. Supp. 372, 373-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (not-
ing that "[tihis Cheshire Cat type prima facie case can only bring confusion to our
craft.').
9 Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1995).
1 See Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1335; Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 65 (2d
Cir. 1995) (all that is required at the first stage is a "de minimis" showing); see also
Austin v. Ford Models, 149 F.3d 148, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1998) (*The requirements for
establishing a prima facie case are 'minimal"); Stem v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in
the City of N.Y., 131 F.3d 305, 314 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) ('I believe
that [the plaintiff's] prima facie case is precisely the kind of minimal one discussed in
this court's in banc decision in Fisher.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
3, United States Postal Serv. Bd. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. .711, 715 (1983) (quoting
Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
32 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 851 (1998).
3 114 F.3d at 1337.
m 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
[Vol. 64:2
ASSESSING EVIDENCE IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
plained the defendant's burden in the second stage of the analysis
by addressing the narrow question whether, "after the plaintiff has
proved a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the burden
shifts to the defendant to persuade the court-by a preponderance of
the evidence that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the
challenged employment action existed."" The Court made clear in
Burdine that defendant's burden is merely one of production, re-
quiring the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for an
adverse employment action.36
The defendant's burden, therefore, in the McDonnell Douglas
three-part scheme is not onerous. 7 A defendant literally "need on-
ly articulate-but need not prove" a nondiscriminatory reason for its
action. 8 An employer will always articulate a nondiscriminatory
reason for its action. After all, "[a]ny such stated purpose is suffi-
cient to satisfy the defendant's burden of production; the employer
does not have to persuade the court that the stated purpose was the
actual reason for its decision."" Indeed, there is not a single re-
ported case in which a plaintiff prevails at the second step in a
discrimination lawsuit because a defendant employer is unwilling or
unable to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
employment action. Thus, this step in the McDonnell Douglas
framework, like the plaintiff's prima facie case, has become nothing
more than a "mechanical formality."4"
2 Id. at 250.
The employer "need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the
proffered reasons'; it need only "raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discrimi-
nated against the plaintiff" by introducing some evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for its decision. Id. at 254-55, 257.
"' "Indeed, this second stage is little more than a mechanical formality; a defendant,
unless silent, will almost always [be able to discharge its burden].' Shifting Burdens,
supra note 3, at 1590. In addition to explaining the defendant's burden, the Burdine
Court also attempted to explain why it established the burden-shifting scheme in the first
instance. The Court stated that the burden-shifting scheme "is intended progressively to
sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.' Id. at
256 n.8.
"' Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d Cir. 1995), aff'd en banc, 114
F.3d 1332 (1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 851 (1998).
" Austin v. Ford Models, 149 F.3d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Fisher, 114 F.3d
at 1335-36).




Of the three prongs of the McDonnell Douglas test, the pretext
prong is perhaps the most confusing. While the Supreme Court
clarified the second prong of the analysis in Burdine, courts contin-
ued to struggle with the third prong of the analysis. One question
that confounded courts was whether the plaintiff at this stage in the
analysis simply needed to prove that the defendant's articulated
justification was pretextual or if the plaintiff was required to offer
additional proof of discriminatory intent.
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve this question in
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks." The Court held there that
proof of pretext alone does not compel a finding in favor of the
plaintiff. Rather, the fact-finder's disbelief of the reasons claimed by
the defendant for the challenged action "may, together with ele-
ments of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimi-
nation."42 The Hicks decision sparked a great deal of scholarly de-
bate and criticism43 as well as disagreement among the circuits as
to what the Court meant in Hicks when it said that disbelief of the
employer's reasons may suffice to show intentional discrimination.
The Second Circuit complicated the McDonnell Douglas pre-
text analysis in Fisher v. Vassar College." It held in Fisher that
once the defendant employer proffers legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for a challenged employment action, to defeat a motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff is then "obliged to produce not
41 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
42 Id. at 510-11 (emphasis added).
-1 See, e.g., Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning
the Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997 (1994); William R. Corbett, The 'Fall' of
Summers, the Rise of "Pretext Plus,' and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employ-
ment Discrimination Law to Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30
GA. L. REV. 305, 342-58 (1996); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate
Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2237 (1995) (arguing that in the after-
math of Hicks, the McDonnell Douglas scheme ought to be abandoned); Mark A.
Schuman, The Politics of Presumption: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks and the Bur-
dens of Proof in Employment Discrimination Cases, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENTARY
67, 84-95 (1993); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Su-
preme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 328-34 (1997); see Bursting Bubbles, supra
note 3, at 217-29, for a complete discussion and analysis of the varying interpretations
of Hicks. See also Edward T. Ellis, Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Federal
Courts of Appeals After St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, SC08 ALI-ABA 663, 667-68,
674-79 (1997).
44 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 851 (1998).
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simply 'some' evidence, but 'sufficient' evidence to support a ratio-
nal finding that the.., proffered reasons by the employer were
false, and that more likely than not discrimination was the real
reason for the discharge."" The plaintiff may not prevail without
evidence that, "on its own, unaided by any artificially
prescribed presumption, reasonably supports the inference of
discrimination."46
Thus, under Fisher, a plaintiff in the Second Circuit must prove
discrimination without the benefit of the presumption of discrimina-
tion that the McDonnell Douglas test originally contemplated.47
Practically, what this means is that a court must address two
separate questions at this stage in the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
The first question is whether there was pretext. Because the
employer at this point has offered a purported, nondiscriminatory
explanation for its actions, the plaintiff must prove that the offered
explanation is not true. The second question the court must then
address is, assuming there was pretext, what the pretext was
for-that is, whether the pretext was intended to mask an illegal or
discriminatory motive. 8
Hence, once the defendant employer discharges its burden in
prong two, the initial presumption of unlawful discrimination "sim-
ply drops out of the picture"49 and the question becomes the
"same question asked in any other civil case: Has the plaintiff
shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant is
liable for the alleged conduct?"" Thus, after initially analyzing all
of the evidence for the first and second prongs and analyzing all of
the evidence a second time to answet the two questions that make
Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 714 (2d Cir. 1996).
Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1334.
47 Critics of the Fisher decision argue that it further burdens plaintiffs 'who face the
already difficult task of indirectly proving discriminatory motive.' Scott A. Moss & Daniel
A. Malin, Note, Public Funding for Disability Accommodations: A Rational Solution to
Rational Discrimination and the Disabilities of the ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
197, 236 n.85 (1998); Arthur D. Rutkowski & Barbara Lang Rutkowski, 12 No. 8 EM-
PLOYMENT L. UPDATE 6 (1997).
' A finding of pretext does "not necessarily mean that the true motive was the
illegal one argued by plaintiff.' Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1338 (citation omitted).
"[D]iscrimination does not lurk behind every inaccurate statement." Id. at 1337. Rather,
the pretext may mask some other motivation such as "back-scratching, log-rolling, horse-
trading, institutional politics, envy, nepotism, spite, or personal hostility." Id.
49 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993).
"o Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1336.
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up the third prong, the court must confront the evidence a third
time to answer the ultimate question of whether the plaintiff has
carried the burden of proof.
II. THE NEED FOR A CHANGE
In Burdine, the Supreme Court declared that the purpose of the
McDonnell Douglas test was "to sharpen the inquiry into the elu-
sive factual question of intentional discrimination.""1 It also de-
scribed the test as "merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the
evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical
question of discrimination." 2 Time and experience tell a different
story.
First, the prima facie case has evolved into something of a
formality. In fact, many courts simply presume that the plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case.53 Nonetheless, for those courts that
do analyze the prima facie showing, the fourth element of the prima
facie case overlaps, and is duplicative of, the pretext prong of the
McDonnell Douglas test.
Second, the articulation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory rea-
son for an employer's action has also evolved into a meaningless
formality. It defies logic that any employer would not be able to
satisfy its burden given the lenient standard under which the
defendant employer's burden of production is judged.
Finally, the pretext prong of the test continues to divide courts
and engender confusion. Not only is this prong seemingly identical
to the fourth element of the prima facie case, but what the plaintiff
sI Texas Community Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981).
s2 Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
An increasing number of district courts in the Second Circuit presume that a pri-
ma facie case of discrimination has been established. See, e.g., Bickerstaff v. Vassar
College, 992 F. Supp. 372, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Brieant, J.); Jugueta v. Perry, No. 95
Civ. 10303, 1997 WL 742535, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1997) (Chin, J.); Lacoparra v.
Pergament Home Ctrs., Inc., 982 F. Supp. 213, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Conner, J.);
Bumpus v. Runyon, No. 93 Civ. 3264, 1997 WL 539924, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1997)
(Preska, J.); Owens v. Waldorf-Astoria Corp., No. 92 Civ. 4561, 1997 WL 251556, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1997) (Griesa, J.); Santiago v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 956 F. Supp.
144, 155 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (Munson, J.); Holmes v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 94 Civ.
3564, 1996 WL 560193, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 1996) (Caden, J.); Coleman v. Runyon,
898 F. Supp. 223, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Knapp, J.). Even the Second Circuit agrees that
courts should not be 'preoccupied with' whether a prima facie case has been proved
by the plaintiff. See Sweeney v. Research Found. of State Univ. of N.Y., 711 F.2d 1179,
1184 (2d Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 64:2
ASSESSING EVIDENCE IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
must prove at this stage in the analysis is confusing. Indeed, courts
have adopted inconsistent theories as to the plaintiff's burden. In
the Second Circuit, analysis of this prong requires an assessment of
two separate questions.
Clearly, then, the inquiry into elusive factual questions is not
being "sharpened." Moreover, the "sensible, orderly" three-pronged
approach now requires a court to engage in a cumbersome seven-
step analysis-four elements for prong one, one element for prong
two, and two elements for prong three. Successful application of the
prongs not only requires the court to navigate through seven distinct
steps of inquiry, but it requires the court to assess the evidence in
the case three separate times. Given this labyrinth, it is not surpris-
ing that criticism of the McDonnell Douglas test continues to
mount.
The evolution of the test, including the Supreme Court's "clari-
fications" in cases like Burdine and Hicks, has only exacerbated
matters. Confusion and conflict persist and disagreement over the
usefulness of the approach continues. 4 Indeed, courts continue to
struggle with unanswered questions as to the quantum of evidence
necessary to survive dispositive motions or to support jury findings
of intentional discrimination based on indirect evidence. Recent
Second Circuit cases demonstrate this point vividly.
For instance, in Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel,"5 the Sec-
ond Circuit held that only courts, not juries, "should determine
whether the initial McDonnell Douglas burdens of production have
been met[ ] [because r]equiring the jury to play the ping-pong-like
match of shifting burdens is confusing and entirely unnecessary.""
Greenway leads to the anomalous situation in which one set of
rules applies for the court, and a different set of instructions, pre-
' See Judith Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts about Social Perception and Em-
ployment Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue,
46 EMORY L.J. 1487, 1517-28 (1997); see also Julie S. Northup, Note & Comment, The
'Same Actor Inference" in Employment Discrimination: Cheap Justice?, 73 WASH. L. REV.
193, 193 (1998) ("Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individu-
alized determination . . . .") (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972)).
s 143 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1998).
s' Id. at 53; see also William D. Frumkin & Louis G. Santangelo, Second Circuit




sumably clearer, simpler, and better, applies for the jury. If the test
is too confusing and unhelpful for the jury, 7 one wonders how it
can be useful to the court.58
Other recent Second Circuit cases demonstrate the extent to
which courts and juries are struggling with the difficulties of proof
of discrimination. In the 1997-98 term, the Second Circuit reversed
grants of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases at
least three times, 9 reversed jury verdicts finding discrimination at
least two times, 60 and affirmed a district court's setting aside of a
jury verdict at least once61 because of issues concerning the
sufficiency of evidence.
The critical inquiry in a discrimination case is how to weigh
the evidence presented by the parties. The only direct evidence
generally available usually "centers on what the defendant allegedly
said or did .... [and because] the defendant will rarely admit to
having said or done what is alleged ... the issue frequently be-
comes one of assessing the credibility of the parties."62 McDonnell
Douglas provides no guidance on this issue.
" The Eighth Circuit's Manual of Model Civil Jury Instruction specifically advises
against instructing the jury on the McDonnell Douglas test. See MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 5.01 (1998) (It is
unnecessary and inadvisable to instruct the jury regarding the three-step analy-
sis ... [so] this instruction is focused on the ultimate issue of whether the plaintiff's
protected characteristic was a 'motivating factor' in the defendant's employment deci-
sion.'). Other circuit courts intone similar sentiments. See, e.g., Mullen v. Princess Anne
Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130, 1137 (4th Cir. 1988) ("overly complex' instructions
that include burden-shifting require comprehension "beyond the function and expertise of
the jury.'); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979) ('to read its
technical aspects to a jury ...will add little to the juror's understanding of the
case .... ").
58 The court may not be the best arbiter of discriminatory practices either. In a
recent Second Circuit opinion, Judge Weinstein, sitting by designation, asserted that "[a]
federal judge is not in the best position to define the current sexual tenor of American
cultures in their many manifestations." Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir.
1998).
11 Danzer v. Norden Sys., Inc., 151 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998); Gallagher, 139 F.3d at
338; Stem v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 1997).
60 See Norton v. Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 1998); Pollis v. New
School for Soc. Research, 132 F.3d 115, 123-24 (2d Cir. 1997).
61 See Galdieri-Ambrosini v. National Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 292 (2d
Cir. 1998).
62 Danzer, 151 F.3d at 57. Plaintiffs are not required to produce direct evidence of
discrimination. In fact, "a case may be built entirely out of circumstantial evidence."
Norton, 145 F.3d at 119.
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More troubling, however, is the fact that the McDonnell
Douglas test "actually invites juries and courts to lose sight of" the
ultimate issue in an employment discrimination case.63 The test
simply does not address or help resolve the question of whether the
plaintiff has met her or his burden of proving that the adverse em-
ployment decision was motivated, at least in part, by an "impermis-
sible reason."' The test compounds the problem by forcing the
court to engage in a cumbersome analysis that, as discussed above,
really entails a seven-step inquiry. McDonnell Douglas is "unduly
burdensome" when the court has to assess a single allegation of
discrimination; the burden increases dramatically when a plaintiff
alleges multiple claims.6" The image of neatly shifting burdens is
largely illusory; the McDonnell Douglas is no longer a useful
way of assessing the sufficiency of discrimination allegations.
While the Second Circuit has danced around criticism of the
McDonnell Douglas test, district courts in the Second Circuit have
explicitly voiced criticism of the burden-shifting scheme. For in-
stance, one court recently commented that "in this case (as in so
many others), the various burden shifts.., shed little, if any, light
on the question to be decided."66 Another court openly observed
that the test does not "promote an expeditious resolution" of a
discrimination case.67
As a consequence, several district court judges now dispense
with the first two prongs of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, by
assuming the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case and noting
the defendant's articulated business justifications for its actions, and
proceed directly to determining whether the plaintiff in a discrimi-
nation case has proven that it is more likely than not that the
employer's decision was motivated at least in part by an impermissi-
ble or discriminatory reason.6" District courts in the Second Circuit
I Lapsley v. Columbia Univ.-College of Physicians and Surgeons, 999 F. Supp. 506,
514 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
6 Stratton v. Dep't for the Aging, 132 F.3d 869, 878-81 (2d Cir. 1997); Fields v.
New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 115 F.3d
116, 119 (2d Cir. 1997).
Lapsley, 999 F. Supp. at 514.
Jalal v. Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 4 F. Supp. 2d 224, 233 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (emphasis added).
67 Fierro v. Saks Fifth Ave., 13 F. Supp. 2d 481, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see also
Cully v. Milliman & Robertson, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 4346, 1998 WL 651057, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1998) ("it is becoming increasingly apparent that discrimination cases
would progress more sensibly without [the McDonnell Douglas framework].") (Motley, J.).
" These courts 'proceed to the ultimate issue" by examining a party's evidence of
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do this because "it is simpler and more straightforward to move
directly to the ultimate question" in a discrimination case.69
Criticizing McDonnell Douglas or presuming away its superflu-
ous prongs, however, is not enough. A different approach is neces-
sary. What follows, therefore, is a more thorough examination of
how a court should analyze evidence to decide the "ultimate ques-
tion." We propose that the suggested approach discussed in the
next section replace the McDonnell Douglas scheme."0
Ill. PROPOSAL: A MORE DIRECT APPROACH
In view of the well-founded and extensive criticisms of the
McDonnell Douglas test, it is clear that the framework should be
discarded. The more difficult question, of course, is what is a better
alternative.
discrimination. See Hutcherson v. City of New York, No. 95 CIV. 10074, 1998 WL
661490, at *3 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1998) (Cedarbaum, J.). Lanahan v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co. of N.Y., 15 F. Supp. 2d 381, 382-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Sotomayor, J.); Fierro, 13
F. Supp. 2d at 488 (Brieant, J.); Harris v. New York City Dep't of Homeless Servs.
Eligibility Investigation Unit, No. 97 Civ. 432, 1998 WL 205334, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
28, 1998) (Scheindlin, J.); Jalal, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 232-33; Lapsley, 999 F. Supp. at 515;
Shafrir v. Ass'n of Reform Zionists, 998 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Chin, J.); Miles v.
North General Hosp., 998 F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Chin, J.); Padob v. Extex Info.
Serv., 960 F. Supp. 806, 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Scheindlin, J.); see also supra note 53
(citing Second Circuit district court cases in which courts presumed prima facie case was
met by plaintiff); Ruane v. Continental Cas. Co., No. 96 Civ. 7153, 1998 WL 292103,
at *8 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 1998) (acknowledging the 'heavy criticism' of the
McDonnell Douglas test).
Lanahan, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 384.
70 The McDonnell Douglas test is being applied to an ever-increasing number of dis-
crimination cases brought pursuant to laws other than Title VII. See Melissa A. Essary &
Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA:
Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, Unresolved Courts, 63 Mo. L. REv. 115
(1998); Lianne C. Knych, Note, Assessing the Application of McDonnell Douglas to
Employment Discrimination Claims Brought Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
79 MINN. L. REv. 1515 (1995); Timothy A. Ogden, Note, Shifting Burdens and the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Why McDonnell Douglas Should Apply to the ADA, 29
IND. L. REv. 179 (1995); Kevin W. Williams, Note, The Reasonable Accommodation
Difference: The Effect of Applying the Burden Shifting Frameworks Developed Under
Title VII in Disparate Treatment Cases to Claims Brought Under Title I of the Americans
With Disabilities Act, 18 BERKELEY J. OF EMP. & LAB. L. 98 (1997); Family and Medical
Leave Act-Burden of Proof-McDonnell Douglas Approach, 13 No. 3 FED. LMGATOR 70
(March 1998); see also Annis v. County of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir.
1998) (borrowing the burden-shifting framework of Title VII claims to analyze whether
conduct was unlawfully discriminatory for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The need to
abandon the test, therefore, becomes more urgent as time goes by.
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The best approach is perhaps the most basic one: first, evaluat-
ing plaintiff's proof, direct or otherwise, of discrimination; second,
evaluating defendant's proof that it did not discriminate, including
evidence of defendant's explanation for its employment decision;
and third, evaluating the evidence as a whole. Courts should focus
on the "ultimate issue" of whether the plaintiff has proven that it is
more likely than not that the employer's decision was motivated at
least in part by an impermissible or discriminatory reason. In a
summary judgment context or on a motion for judgment as a matter
of law following a verdict for the plaintiff, the court must evaluate
the evidence as a whole resolving all conflicts in the proof and
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.71
In evaluating the evidence, courts must keep two concepts in
mind. First, the issue is intentional discrimination; the plaintiff has
the burden at all times of proving, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that she or he was the victim of intentional discrimina-
tion.72 It is not enough simply to prove unfair, irrational, or even
"stupid" or "wicked" treatment,73 nor are a plaintiff's subjective or
conclusory beliefs of discrimination sufficient by themselves to
generate a genuine issue for trial. As the Second Circuit recently
noted, "a jury cannot infer discrimination from thin air." Like-
wise, proof of pretext, that a defendant's stated reasons for its em-
ployment decision are not genuine, may not be sufficient, by itself,
to prove discrimination; the jury must be able to ultimately
determine that the pretext was intended to mask discrimination."
" Galdieri-Ambrosini v. National Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 289 (2d Cir.
1998) (motion for judgment as a matter of law); Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338,
345 (2d Cir. 1998) (summary judgment motion).
72 See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (stating that the
"ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discrimi-
nated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.") (quoting Texas Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
"' Norton v. Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) ('mhe ADEA does not
make employers liable for doing stupid or even wicked things; it makes them liable for
discriminating, for firing people on account of their age."); Pollis v. New School for Soc.
Research, 132 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Absent some evidence that it was motivat-
ed by discriminatory intent, . . . bad treatment does not establish a violation of Title
VIl.').
'4 Norton, 145 F.3d at 119.
' Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1998); Fisher v.




The second concept to keep in mind at the same time is that
proof of discrimination is often elusive. Because an employer's
"intent and state of mind are implicated,"76 rarely is there "direct,
smoking gun, evidence of discrimination."77 Consequently, plain-
tiffs usually must prove their claims of discrimination through indi-
rect and circumstantial proof.78 Courts must continue to be mindful
that "clever men may easily conceal their motivations."79 All a
plaintiff need do is persuade a finder of fact that it is more likely
than not that the adverse employment decision was motivated at
least in part by a discriminatory reason.
We discuss in more detail below the three steps of the
proposed analysis.
A. Plaintiff's Proof
The first step is to evaluate the plaintiff's proof. As a threshold
matter, the individual pieces of evidence presented by the plaintiff
to prove discrimination should be identified. The court should
then consider whether this evidence, taken as a whole and accepted
76 Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.).
Richards v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 668 F. Supp. 259, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
aff'd, 842 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1988); see Danzer v. Norden Sys., Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 57
(2d Cir. 1998) ('In discrimination cases, the only direct evidence available very often
centers on what the defendant allegedly said or did."); Thombrough v. Columbus and
Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Employers are rarely so coop-
erative as to include a notation in the personnel file, 'fired due to age,' or to inform a
dismissed employee candidly that he is too old for the job." (citation omitted)); see also
Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that direct
proof of improper bias is "often unavailable or difficult to find').
" See Norton, 145 F.3d at 119 ("a case may be' built entirely out of circumstantial
evidence'); Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1997) (plaintiff is not
required to produce direct evidence of discrimination).
I Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974)); accord
Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 465 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Tyler v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1187 (2d Cir. 1992) ('[If] there is at the very
least a thick cloud of smoke," an employer must "convince the factfinder that, despite
the smoke, there is no fire.") (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 266
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
ao See, e.g., Danzer 151 F.3d at 57 (identifying five pieces of evidence that taken
together as true were sufficient to support a jury finding of discrimination); Norton, 145
F.3d at 119 (identifying three facts proved by plaintiff to support inference of discrim-
ination and holding that these facts, together with plaintiff's "highly dubious showing of
pretext," was not sufficient to support inference of discrimination); Lapsley v. Columbia
Univ.-College of Physicians and Surgeons, 999 F. Supp. 506, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (iden-
tifying and evaluating four categories of evidence relied on by plaintiff).
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at face value, would be sufficient to support a jury's ultimate deter-
mination of discrimination. If the answer is no, then the court need
proceed no further. The defendant would be entitled to summary
judgment or judgment as a matter of law.
If the facts alleged would be sufficient to support a finding of
discrimination, then the plaintiff's evidence must be separately eval-
uated to determine whether the different pieces of evidence can be
relied upon. Is the evidence admissible? Is the evidence concrete
and specific or is it merely conclusory and subjective? Does the
evidence prove the point for which it has been presented? Does the
evidence actually support an inference of discrimination?8'
Of course, in evaluating the plaintiff's evidence on a motion for
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law, the court may
not engage in fact-finding, and the evidence must be interpreted in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Moreover, although each
piece of evidence must be separately evaluated, the court must be
mindful that the jury would be entitled to view the evidence as a
whole.2 A discriminatory comment, for example, that might be
considered, by itself, an inadmissible "stray remark" may be admis-
sible if "other indicia of discrimination" are present. 3 Likewise,
although a "sudden and unexpected downturn" in a performance
evaluation does not, by itself, permit an inference of discrimination,
it may constitute some proof of discrimination if supported by other
such evidence."
After evaluating plaintiff's evidence, the court must then consid-
er what admissible, relevant evidence remains. The question is
whether plaintiff's different "pieces of circumstantial evidence""
"I See, e.g., Pollis v. New School for Soc. Research, 132 F.3d 115, 123 (2d Cir.
1997) (where statistics were based on "tiny' sample spread over long period of time
composed largely of individuals who were not comparable to plaintiff, the statistics did
not reasonably support an inference of discrimination).
a2 Stem v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 314 (2d Cir. 1997) (criticizing
the dissent for "considerling] the record solely in piecemeal fashion, proffering innocent
explanations for individual strands of evidence,' and noting that the jury was "entitled to
view the evidence as a whole').
I Danzer, 151 F.3d at 56; see also Shafrir v. Ass'n of Reform Zionists, 998 F.
Supp. 355, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that alleged comments by a supervisor coupled
with 'all the circumstances of the case' satisfied plaintiff's burden and could lead a
reasonable person to infer that the termination of employment was illegally
discriminatory).
' Danzer, 151 F.3d at 56; see also Miles v. North Gen. Hosp., 998 F. Supp. 377,
388 (holding that a jury could find that the employer's claim of poor performance was
a pretext "intended to mask [the employer's] desire to fire plaintiff.").
" Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1338 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert.
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BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
and the other "bits and pieces of available evidence" together are
sufficient to support an inference of discrimination, i.e., whether
together they create a "mosaic" of intentional discrimination.86
B. Defendant's Proof
If plaintiff's admissible evidence is sufficient to support an
inference of discrimination, the next step is to evaluate the
defendant's evidence that it did not discriminate. This will usually
consist of evidence offered to contradict or undermine plaintiff's
proof of discrimination as well as evidence that the employer acted
for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. For example, the employ-
er may offer evidence of performance problems on the part of the
plaintiff 7 or evidence that "the person who made the decision to
fire was the same person who made the decision to hire."88
The defendant's evidence should be evaluated in the same way
as the plaintiff's evidence-for admissibility, relevancy, and materi-
ality. In evaluating the defendant's evidence, courts must be sensi-
tive to the fine line that exists between "second-guess[ing] an
employer's hiring standards" and subjecting the employer's
articulated justifications for its actions "to scrutiny under Title
VII.
s89
On a motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of
law, the court cannot merely credit the employer's explanation of
its actions or draw inferences in favor of the employer.' Rather,
the employer must put forth proof that supports its explanation.
Otherwise, a plaintiff is unlikely to ever survive a dispositive motion
because. merely articulating an explanation for an adverse
employment decision is not an onerous task.91
Unlike plaintiff's evidence, the employer can provide the court
with more 'direct" evidence to support its explanation for an em-
ployment action. For instance, the employer can provide documen-
denied, 118 S. Ct. 851 (1998).
Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998).
"7 Lapsley v. Columbia Univ.-College of Physicians and Surgeons, 999 F. Supp. 506,
522 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 560 (2d Cir. 1997).
'9 Stem v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 313 (2d Cir. 1997).
90 Id. at 313-14.
91 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
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tation concerning performance problems,92  employee
misconduct,9  and statistics regarding its hiring, firing, and
promotion of employees. 94
C. The Evidence as a Whole
Finally, the evidence must be considered as a whole. The ques-
tion is whether, after resolving all conflicts in the evidence and
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, a reason-
able jury could find that it was more likely than not that the plaintiff
was discriminated against for an impermissible reason. It is not
enough that some evidence of discrimination remains, for, as the
Second Circuit has held:
[Slome evidence is not sufficient to withstand a properly supported mo-
tion for summary judgment; a plaintiff opposing such a motion must pro-
duce sufficient evidence to support a rational finding that the legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by the employer were false, and that
more likely than not the ... [alleged unlawful reason] was the real reason
for the discharge."
Because of this standard, assessing the evidence as a whole is the
most difficult part of the analysis.
Determining whether evidence permits a rational inference of
discriminatory intent or, rather, gives rise to mere "speculation and
conjecture" requires courts to draw a "careful distinction."96 After
all, "[a]n inference is not a suspicion or a guess. It is a reasoned,
logical decision to conclude that a disputed fact exists .... .97
92 See, e.g., Lapsley, 999 F. Supp. at 522 (where employer offered documentation
concerning employee's deficiencies as well as sworn statements by supervisors about
employee and employee's own admissions); Miles v. North Gen. Hosp., 998 F. Supp.
377, 387 (where employer offered numerous- performance evaluations and other docu-
ments concerning plaintiff's deficient performance about which plaintiff had been
warned).
" See, e.g., Shafrir v. Ass'n of Reform Zionists, 998 F. Supp. 355, 362 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (employer offered substantial evidence that it fired employee because employee
"refused to return to work when ordered to.).
Miles, 998 F. Supp. at 387-88 (where employer offered compiled data to demon-
strate that it did not discriminate against older employees of Jamaican national origin).
woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
Jalal v. Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 4 F. Supp. 2d 224, 235 (S.D.N.Y.
1998).




Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff has presented some
arguable evidence of discrimination, the court must look more
critically at the evidence as a whole to determine if an employer's
conduct was legitimate and lawful.98
In addition, the court must go beyond determining that a rea-
sonable jury could infer pretext when it views the evidence as a
whole. As discussed in Part I, supra, the court must also be persuad-
ed as to the "ultimate issue," that a reasonable jury could find that
the pretext was a 'mask for ... discrimination,"99 that, more likely
than not, the employer's "proffered reason was not the true reason
for the employment decision, and that race [or some other
impermissible factor] was."' °
If, viewing the evidence as a whole, the court concludes that a
plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in her
or his favor on the "ultimate issue," the court must deny any
dispositive motion by the employer.
D. The Benefits of the Approach
The McDonnell Douglas test unquestionably confuses and
distorts the critical inquiry concerning the "ultimate issue" in dis-
crimination cases. The Supreme Court's goal that the ordering of
proof prescribed by the test be a tool "to sharpen the inquiry into
the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination" °" re-
mains unfulfilled. The goal, on the other hand, is a laudable one
that can be achieved by using the simpler, clearer method to assess
proof of discrimination as outlined above.
Eliminating the McDonnell Douglas three-prong (seven-
step °2) test will free parties and courts from having to engage in
the tedious and tiresome burden-shifting exercise that, in the end,
proves little and adds nothing. Courts and parties will, therefore, be
able to focus on what actually matters-identifying and assessing
See Lapsley v. Columbia Univ.-College of Physicians and Surgeons, 999 F. Supp.
506, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (determining that plaintiff did not present a "thick cloud' of
smoke, but only a "fleeting wisp' that was "easily dissipated' by the employer's prool).
9 Id. at 523.
"9' Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1336 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 851 (1998) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 507-08 (1993)).
101 Texas Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981).
'o' See supra Part I.
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evidence of discrimination. This is a desirable result for everyone.
The modified approach suggested above achieves this result while,
at the same time, providing courts and parties with guidance as to
how evidence will be assessed and dispositive motions will be
judged.
CONCLUSION
Once all the burdens have shifted pursuant to the McDonnell
Douglas test, courts must still address the ultimate and key issue in
a discrimination case: whether the plaintiff has presented evidence
from which a rational finder of fact could conclude that the defen-
dant illegally discriminated against her or him. This ultimate issue,
however, can be addressed without relying upon the cumbersome,
confusing, burden-shifting scheme. We have argued here that it
should be done without relying on that scheme. It is time to discard
the McDonnell Douglas test in favor of a simpler, better method for
weighing evidence of discrimination. The "ping-pong-like match"
that has produced a "thick accretion" of confusing precedents
should be abandoned.
1998]

